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User-adaptive systems typically work in environments where data are 
“noisy”. One of the biggest problems in AI and Robotics is that most existing 
systems do not address the problem that a collection of data about user or 
environment is not sufficient for having a user model. The same dataset may give 
rise to different information according to different current user plans or goals. 
Thus there may be different views or “senses” that depend on theoretical implicit 
presuppositions. Most current systems just make use of commonsense 
presuppositions (embedded in programmers’ heads) and often it is not clear how 
such presuppositions were translated into the computational models. On the other 
hand, the value of using technological intelligent systems in psychological 
research is now commonly understood, but models are generally still too “static” 
because they do not fully exploit the possibilities of dynamic interaction with 
users. 
The present paper presents “I Am For You” (IM4U), a psychologically 
oriented project, aimed at tackling these issues. As a general objective, this 
project is aimed at developing a distributed cognitive system, possibly based on a 
Smart Space with ubiquitous sensors /actuators as well as multimodal interfaces, 
which, by a continuous interaction with its user, is able to monitor user behaviour 
and other relevant events, in order to build a dynamic user model. 
In this model, psychological theories and results of cognitive experiments in 
the literature, as well as new hypotheses and experiments, inform and drive the 
design of the knowledge base and of perceptual and inferential processes. This 
allows to give an interpretation of data (what we call "making sense") and take 
decisions which better fit the profile of the user. Differently from most traditional 
systems, theories that are used for making sense must be explicitly stated, and 
also protocols for translating them into computational directives are essential part 
of the interpreting system.  
 
2. Making sense 
Any intelligent system, prior to interaction with the human, is assumed to be 
in a situation where it has no way to make use of stimuli in the environment, 
whatever sensory modality is involved (vision, hearing, touch). Even if it is 
placed in a sensorially very rich environment, if it is not well-equipped with some 
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psychological capabilities, it can be considered like humans placed in an 
environment where all sensory stimulation is suppressed, a situation that has been 
experimentally studied as “sensory deprivation” (e.g. see Barabasz & Barabasz, 
1993). 
Traditional intelligent and robotic systems strive for translating sensory 
information into perceptual stimuli for pattern recognition, but this is not enough. 
Sensory information, in fact, can be really used if it can be placed inside a 
meaningful context. Any artificial system is also placed, at the start, in a situation 
that can be defined of “semantic deprivation” (Greco, 1997), because it has no 
way to make a sensible use of sensorial input, like people who are placed in a 
situation where stimuli are meaningless and there is no obvious connection with 
actions performed. Semantic deprivation is a situation where a clear meaning of 
objects, events, actions is not presupposed, a situation where a human or an agent 
is not able to “make sense”, to know what is happening and/or how to manage it 
(i.e. what to do). In this situation, perceived features cannot be connected with 
each other, do not match a single framework or schema, because no previous 
experience can help in doing that. We call “making sense” here the capability of 
developing strategies for coping with this sort of semantic deprivation. 
We claim then that a ubiquitous system that is designed to interact and 
possibly cooperate with humans must have some “making sense” capabilities. 
Such capabilities will come to the system by analysing and fully exploiting 
knowledge coming from cognitive and psychological theories. This is the 
Operational Analysis of Cognitive Theories (OACT), which will be described 
here. 
 
3. Operational Analysis of Cognitive Theories (OACT) 
The purpose of OACT is to provide the IM4U system with some embedded 
psychological knowledge.  
The IM4U system is designed to be modular, so as to allow it the greatest 
possible flexibility. It is composed of a core engine and a collection of special-
purpose plugins. The core engine is scenario-independent and performs basic 
operations, like raw sensory data processing, event detection by subsymbolic or 
hybrid techniques, symbol grounding, and user model outputting. It interacts and 
cooperates with plugins using an analysis-by-synthesis method (see below) in 
order to fit as much as possible the characteristic plugin behavioral ontologies, 
which are pre-defined, as we see next. Technical details about the core engine are 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Each available plugin is designed to deal with one aspect drawn from a theory, 
which is considered relevant in one related scenario. A special type of plugins 
are the experimental plugins (see below), which are designed to perform 
dynamic experiments. Given the modular and open nature of the system, the 
collection of plugins may in the future be enriched by using our method also by 
other researchers. 
Each plugin will concern situation descriptions, coded as ontologies, 
concerning theory-driven expectations and related decisions. Such ontologies 
may include standard information about objects, locations, etc. but also possible 
behaviour and user psychological aspects, according to the related theoretical 
meaning. Standard decisions will affect user model updating, and performing 
common actions like giving messages, asking questions, operating physical 
devices, joining persons in a telepresence system, etc. 
 





4. How to build an OACT plugin 
Stage (A), formal: (1) Scenario analysis and selection of relevant theories; (2) 
Selection of relevant sub-theories (e.g. if “distraction” is the currently 
considered plugin, the cognitive theory of situation awareness, the theory of 
executive functions, etc. are relevant). (3) Formal analysis of theories: each 
theory is formally analysed and its theoretical statements are put into more 
simple schematic expressions, in natural language, including, as explicit variables, 
observations of behavior, expectations about outcomes, and related conclusions to 
be taken.  
Stage (B), empirical: (1) Experiments with human volunteers performed when 
needed, in order to get more accurate information about knowledge people 
actually have in the considered situation, and observations of how they actually 
behave, by ordinary observation and experimental techniques. Situations may be 
simulated environments at this stage. Experiments may also include, for accurate 
definition of concepts, semantic association or implicit techniques like the IAT 
(Greenwald et al., 2003). (2) Experts consulting: especially in cases when plugins 
are concerned with the prevention of psychological diseases, also interviews 
with clinicians may be performed.  
Stage (C), final, formal again: expressions coming from previous analysis 
are translated, in cooperation with ontology experts, into formal ontologies. 
These will be used by the system as the high-level representation system, and 
matched - interacting with the core engine - with the symbolic representations 
attained bottom-up from sensory data by the symbol grounding process. If the 
intended plugin is an “experimental plugin”, then an experimental paradigm 
will be set up, where the kind of stimuli to be given, the kind of response to be 
monitored, and the decisions to be taken will be included.  
 
5. OACT operation 
In this section we describe how the IM4U system can use and improve its 
making sense capabilities. The standard use of plugins is that the system attempts to 
match observed patterns with expected ones, and decides accordingly to what 
the implemented theory suggests. The most appropriate method for 
performing this task appears to be the analysis-by-synthesis method, inspired 
by Neisser (1967) model on human attention. It consists in setting a 
continuous cycle between top-down expectations and bottom-up data. Coarse 
expectations at the start direct subsequent observation, acting as hypoteses to be 
tested, and expectations become more and more refined as data are analysed. 
This mechanism can be employed to make plugins more dynamical and updatable 
by the system.  
A second, novel paradigm, devised for giving IM4U a unique feature in 
ambient intelligence systems, is the possibility of gradually developing a 
meaningful framework of particular users, greatly augmenting its flexibility. This 
consists in proactively stimulating the user according to defined experimental 
plans. It can be done by the use of “experimental plugins”, which are special 
plugins whose decision part includes the definition of possible stimuli to be given to 
the user in certain conditions, making the system work as an “experimenter”. This 
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way, simple tests about user states can be programmed and the system acquires the 
possibility of dynamically updating the user model, in real time on the basis of 
proactive stimulation.  
Proactive stimulation can also include questioning the user. Almost all user 
interfaces, from PC to smartphone ones, ask questions. But extracting knowledge 
by questioning is not always so simple affair. Also from this side, IM4U systems 
can benefit from cognitive theories. Strategies for chosing a correct communication 
style can be learned from patterns extracted by psychological experiments using a 
sense-making method (Dervin, 1983).  
 
6. Examples 
In this section we shall give some examples of kinds of theories, and related 
scenarios, where the OACT method can be used and how it could work.  
1. Situation awareness theory (Endsley, 1995), being strongly focused on the 
analysis of the situation, is particularly appropriate as a starting theory to be 
analysed (very few attempts to establish ontologies on this topic have already been 
done, e.g. Matheus, Kokar, Backlawski, 2005; Kokar, Matheus, Backlawski, 2009; 
Rodriguez et al., 2014). Setting ontologies is not the whole story, however, since in 
OACT, as we have explained, expectations are conceived as hypotheses to be tested 
by the system during the interaction with the user, and consequently modified and 
refined. 
2. A theory (Johnson & Shiffrar, 2011) describes how from the analysis of 
body motion and posture (walk, etc.) personality aspects, including vulnerability, 
can be inferred. Analysis of usual posture habits could be then automatically 
interpreted as an increased vulnerability risk. Subsequent observations can be 
planned in the system to test this hypothesis.  
3. Some increasing hidden disability in motor coordination, like bradykinesia, 
can be revealed by accurate analysis of user postures, which can be a symptom of 
an incoming Parkinson’s (or other) disease (Cooper & Shallice, 2000). Subsequent 
observations can be planned in the system to test this hypothesis.  
4. If a person stops the habit of listening to music, or exhibits an unusually 
violent behaviour (drops objects to the floor, slams the doors, etc.), then this may be 
detected and interpreted as a symptom of some emotional distress. The tendency to 
multitasking (doing several things at a time) for people, which has been considered 
harmful for cognitive health (Bergman, 2010), can be monitored with a relative 
ease. Other states which can be revealed by real-time behavioural analysis are 
fatigue, lack of sleep, etc.  
In previous examples we have shown how the analysis of a theory leads to 
set new expectations for the system, related to some hypothesis-testing.  
5. An unusual increasing of drinking behaviour could be one symptom of 
incoming depression (Mezuk, Bohnert, Ratliff, Zivin, 2011). Detecting a strong 
change of habit in drinking behaviour can reveal an incoming risk of alcoholism. 
This conclusion may be strengthened if such observation is associated (and related) 
also to spatial memory blackouts (Bowden & Mccarter, 1993; White, 2004) and 
abnormal response perseveration (Oscar-Berman, Hutner, Bonner, 1992). 
Examples of spatial memory blackouts are: not being able to remember things that 
one did, or places that one went in. Response perseveration consists in the 
inappropriate repetition of preceding behaviour when a new adapted response is 
expected.  
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In this example we have shown how the analysis of theories leads the system 
to use and compare different sets of observations that otherwise would have not be 
related. The described kind of responses may be detected by the system, if it is well 
equipped with the appropriate sets of ontologies, connected with the appropriate 
low-level behaviour and event definitions.  
6. During some kinds of psychotherapy (cognitive-behavioural therapy), a  
common practice is to prescribe to the patient certain behaviour to be performed, in 
order to help him/her to relax and/or overcome certain fears or anxieties. Patients 
are encouraged to control their behaviour (e.g. by reporting it in some diary) but 
there are no effective means to help them in doing so. They might agree to seek 
such help from a IM4U intelligent assistant which is able to observe their behaviour 
and match with expected patterns.  
In this example we have shown how the analysis of theories can lead to 
targeted expectations, related to behaviour checking.  
All the examples above show the kind of theories that can be processed for 
eveloping a OACT method. This will consist in “operationalising” expectations 
expressed in linguistic form inside theories, by expressing behaviour and other 
environmental constraints in formal terms compatible with the ontology system 
used by IM4U. This will tell the system exactly what has to be observed, what can 
be expected, and how it has to be compared with previous observations.  
7. The system, by means of experimental plugins, may be used as a tool for 
performing cognitive research or as a novel kind of interactive testing device. As an 
example of proactive stimulation, the system (using its human interface) can try to 
capture user’s attention N times, in condition X and Y, and compute how many 
times s/he responded , and/or the kind of response, reaction times, etc. If the 
number of some kind of responses was below a treshold, then the system proceeds 
with some planned further test, or notifies the user a message, etc. This way, 
psychological knowledge is effectively embedded into the system, improving the 
quality of user understanding and allowing to flexibly adapt to its individual user. 
 
Note 
This work is dedicated to the memory of Nicla Rossini. She would have 
significantly contributed if her lifetime had been enough. 
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